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Abstract
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insur-
ance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the
unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent
the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit
sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that intro-
ducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for
reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both
relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a
system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt.
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1 Introduction
It is generally accepted that public provision of unemployment insurance
(UI) is socially desirable in a world with risk averse individuals. However,
it is also well established that the provision of UI does not come without
adverse incentive effects. For example, more generous UI benefits is likely to
reduce search effort and raise wage pressure, thus causing some increase in
unemployment. The problem facing policy makers is thus to strike an opti-
mal balance between the insurance benefits on the one hand, and the adverse
incentive effects on the other hand. This problem has been the subject of
several recent papers. Our paper contributes to this literature by recogniz-
ing that the government may condition benefit payments on (imperfectly)
observed search effort. This leads us to an analysis of optimal UI design
in a search equilibrium framework where the government has several policy
instruments at its disposal, including the benefit level, the rate at which
search effort is monitored, and the magnitude of the sanction in case search
effort is regarded as insufficient. We find that a system with monitoring and
sanctions represents a welfare improvement relative to other alternatives for
reasonable estimates of the monitoring costs. In particular, the monitoring
and sanction system leads to higher welfare than a system with time limits.
Our results on the desirability of monitoring can be contrasted with a
well-known result that dates back to Becker’s (1968) celebrated paper on op-
timal crime deterrence. In Becker’s analysis (as in ours), monitoring is costly
because resources have to be spent on detecting crime (violations of search
requirements). Punishment, in the form of a fine (sanction), goes without
cost since it involves a transfer of money from one individual to others. To
deter crime the expected fine, i.e., the probability of being caught times the
fine, should be big enough. By raising the fine, monitoring costs can be
reduced without affecting incentives for crime. However, Becker’s analysis
presupposes risk neutral agents. When agents are risk averse and there are
errors in the monitoring technology, Becker’s result need not hold. If the
monitoring technology is plagued by Type II errors, some complying indi-
viduals are sanctioned and these individuals will be subjected to substantial
welfare losses when fines are high.1
1This squares with the conclusion in Polinsky and Shavell (1979). They conclude that
risk aversion weakens the case for the Beckerian policy prescription. Furthermore, they
note that the possibility of making Type II errors reinforces this conclusion. See Garoupa
(1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for recent surveys of the economic theory of law
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Shavell andWeiss (1979) presented a seminal analysis of optimal sequenc-
ing of benefit payments over the spell of unemployment. The key result was
that the benefit level should decline monotonically over the unemployment
spell, because such a profile involves stronger incentives to search. Recently
a number of papers have extended the analysis of Shavell and Weiss. One
strand of the literature adds additional policy instruments; Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997) is a case in point. Another strand of the literature (e.g. Cahuc
and Lehmann, 2000, and Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001) takes account
of firm behavior and allows for endogenous wage determination. Endoge-
nous wages is potentially important since a declining benefit profile can raise
wage pressure. Wage pressure may rise because it is the value of unemploy-
ment upon unemployment entry that enters the worker’s outside option. The
analysis in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), however, suggests that there
is still a case for having a declining profile of benefit payments.
The contributions reviewed above, and most of the other literature on
optimal UI, do not consider that the government can make the receipt of
benefits dependent on the unemployed worker’s search effort. As documented
by Grubb (2001), existing UI systems condition benefit payments on perfor-
mance criteria such as “availability for work” and “active job search”. These
criteria are enforced by some degree of monitoring of the benefit claimants.
The requirements for job search show substantial variations across countries.
Failure to meet search requirements may result in a benefit sanction, i.e.,
a temporary or permanent cut in benefits. A typical duration of sanctions
for a first refusal of a suitable job offer is two to three months. Observed
sanction rates — the total number of sanctions over a year relative to the
stock of beneficiaries — also vary substantially across countries. For example,
sanctions due to insufficient search hovered around 30 percent in the United
States in the late 1990s, whereas other countries (Germany, Denmark, Nor-
way) appear to have undertaken no sanctions related to search inactivity; see
Grubb (2001) for further details.
Recent empirical work has shed light on the effects of changes in search
requirements and monitoring of job search. The arguably most convincing ev-
idence is based on randomized experiments undertaken in the United States.
The “treatments” in these experiments involved the number of employer con-
tacts, the required documentation and the frequency of verification.2 These
enforcement.
2See OECD (2001), Johnson and Klepinger (1994), Benus et al (1997) and Black et al
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studies indicate that either more intensive monitoring or more demanding
search requirements tend to reduce the length of benefit claims. Recent non-
experimental evidence from the Netherlands and Switzerland also suggest
that the imposition of sanctions substantially raises the transition rate to
employment (Abbring et al., 1997; Lalive et al., 2002; van den Berg et al.,
2004). Our reading of the bulk of the evidence is that more intensive moni-
toring and more stringent search requirements do matter for search activity
and transitions out of unemployment.3
The literature on monitoring and sanctions in the context of UI is very
small. The study most closely related to what we do in the present paper
is Boone and van Ours (2000). The model is a version of the Pissarides
(1990) search and matching model and has similarities with the model in
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001). A key feature of the model is that the
unemployed and insured worker can affect the probability of continued UI
receipt by the choice of search effort; the higher the search effort, the lower
the risk of being exposed to a benefit sanction.
The analysis of monitoring and sanctions is clearly related to the analy-
sis of the optimal sequencing of UI benefits. Indeed, one can think of the
declining profile of benefit payments as an indirect “sanction” on deficient
job search. The defining characteristic of a monitoring and sanction system,
however, is that the risk of being sanctioned depends directly on search activ-
ity. This feature can have substantial implications for policy prescriptions.
Let us illustrate this point by considering a world with risk aversion and a
finite arrival rate of job offers. In this situation, a system with a time limit
on UI benefit receipt can never have “Beckerian properties”. The reason is
that some workers will be penalized as time passes. However, a Becker-type
solution is a distinct possibility when the risk of being penalized depends
directly on search. If the monitoring technology is perfect, the government
can implement the optimal search intensity by threatening to impose the
maximal sanction.4 A disadvantage of the monitoring and sanctions system
is that resources are needed for monitoring. The argument in favor of mon-
(2003).
3There is at least one study, van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2001), that fails to
confirm that more intensive monitoring affects transitions out of unemployment. The
authors conjecture that the result may reflect that more stringent monitoring of formal
search induces a substitution away from informal search channels.
4This a viable strategy with risk aversion since nobody will be sanctioned in equilibrium
with a perfect monitoring technology.
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itoring and sanctions depends crucially on the costs associated with such a
system. One of the contributions of the paper is to derive an upper bound
on the marginal cost of monitoring where the monitoring system dominates
the pure time limits for all marginal costs below this upper bound.
In this paper we extend the contributions by Boone and van Ours (2000)
and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) by offering a normative analysis of
a benefit system with costly monitoring and sanctions. The basic model
features two benefit levels which can be thought of as unemployment insur-
ance (UI) and unemployment assistance (UA), respectively. Workers who
receive UI are monitored at a certain rate and, with some probability, ex-
posed to a benefit sanction. The probability of being sanctioned depends
on the worker’s search effort and the precision at which search effort can be
observed by the UI provider. Sanctioned workers receive UA, they are not
monitored, and they need to become reemployed before they are entitled to
UI. We are concerned with the characteristics of the optimal benefit system
when there are four available policy instruments: the level of benefits in UI
and UA (the difference between the two representing the sanction), the rate
at which the unemployed worker entitled to UI is monitored, and the pre-
cision of the monitoring technology that determines how the agent’s search
effort affect the probability of a sanction.
The next section of the paper presents the basic model. Section 3 de-
rives some analytical results concerning the properties of the optimal benefit
system. In section 4, we turn to a numerical analysis of the optimal benefit
system. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Labor Market
We consider an economy with a fixed labor force, which is normalized to unity.
Workers are either employed or unemployed and have infinite horizons. Time
is continuous. An employed worker is separated from his job at an exogenous
Poisson rate φ. Upon entering unemployment, the worker is immediately
eligible for UI benefits.
Recipients of UI benefits are monitored with respect to their search be-
havior. If they fail to meet certain search requirements, they are exposed
to a benefit withdrawal (a sanction). We assume that the sanction lasts for
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the remainder of the unemployment spell. At every instant, there are thus
two groups of unemployed workers: eligible workers who receive benefits and
sanctioned workers who have been exposed to a benefit withdrawal.
Let αj, j = e, s denote the exit rate from unemployment to employment
for an eligible and a sanctioned worker, respectively. The exit rates differ
between the two groups to the extent that their search effort differ. Let sj,
j = e, s, denote search effort. The effective number of searchers in the econ-
omy is then given as S = seue+ ssus, where uj is the number of unemployed
in category j.
The matching function is of the usual constant returns to scale variety:
H = H(S, v), where v is the number of vacancies. Let θ ≡ v/S denote labor
market tightness. The probability per unit time that individual i escapes
unemployment state j is then obtained as αji ≡ s
j
iH(S, v)/S = s
j
iα(θ). Also,
α(θ) = H(S, v)/S = H(1, θ) and hence α0(θ) > 0; the tighter the labor
market, the easier to find a job. Firms fill vacancies at the rate q (θ) =
H(S, v)/v = H(1/θ, 1), and thus q0(θ) < 0; the tighter the labor market, the
more difficult to fill a vacancy. By constant returns to scale, we also have
α(θ) = θq(θ).
While unemployed and receiving UI benefits, an unemployed agent is
monitored at rate µ. We think of monitoring as random inspections of the
worker’s search activity. Given monitoring, there is some probability that
the observed search effort does not meet the search requirement, in which
case the worker is sanctioned. Let π(se) denote the probability of being
sanctioned upon inspection of search effort, implying that UI recipients loose
entitlement at the rate µπ(se).
Having defined the relevant transition rates, we can formulate the steady
state flow equilibrium relationships of the labor market:
φn = αeue + αsus (1)
αsus = µπue (2)
where n = 1− ue − us denotes total employment in the economy. The first
equation pertains to employment whereas the second equation pertains to
the state of unemployment with a sanction. Now we can use (1) and (2) to
solve for employment:
n =
λ (αe + µπ)
φ+ λ(αe + µπ)
(3)
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where λ ≡ ue/(ue+us) = αs/(αs+µπ)) is the ratio of eligible unemployment
to total unemployment.
2.2 Monitoring and Sanctions
Let us make the monitoring and sanctions technology explicit. We choose a
reduced form specification which allows us to have as special cases indefinite
payments of UI benefits (µ = 0), finite duration of UI benefit receipt (µ > 0
and π(sei ) = 1), and a monitoring and sanctions technology. In particular,
we assume that the probability of being sanctioned upon inspection depends
linearly on search: π(sei ) = 1 − σsei . Proposition 2 below gives conditions
under which σ > 0 is optimal. Further, we require that π (sei ) ≥ 0 for all
sei ∈ [0, 1], which, in turn, implies that σ ∈ [0, 1].
The parameter σ measures to which extent the sanction probability de-
pends on an agent’s own search effort. One way to interpret σ is that it
indexes the precision of the inspection technology. For instance, σ = 0 cor-
responds to the situation where it is determined by lottery if the agent has
searched to rule or not; therefore everyone who is monitored is sanctioned
irrespective of search intensity. Alternatively, σ = 0 can be seen as a UI
system with a time limit, as in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001). If, on the
other hand, σ is strictly positive the agent’s search effort matters for the
sanction probability. The higher is σ, the higher the precision with which an
agent’s search effort is observed and rewarded.5
Whereas σ = 0 gives little direct incentive to search, it is an inexpensive
system to operate. This is due to the fact that there are no inspections of
agents’ search effort. On the other hand, σ > 0 gives a direct incentive to
search but also implies that more monitoring officials are needed in order
to inspect agents’ search intensities. So the monitoring cost per monitored
agent is increasing in σ.
More precisely, we assume that the cost of running the monitoring and
sanctioning system, C, is given by:
C = c (σ)µuew (4)
The cost of running the UI-system is increasing in the number of moni-
tored individuals (µue). The rate of increase is determined by c (σ) ≥ 0. This
5From a more general point of view, it is possible to derive this technology from ”first
principles” with the aid of a few assumptions. We present this derivation in Appendix A.
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cost depends on the precision of the inspection technology with c0(σ) ≥ 0 and
c(0) = 0. We think of the inspection of search as a labor intensive activity
and, therefore, the monitoring cost is proportional to the aggregate wage w.
2.3 Worker Behavior
The employed worker’s (indirect) instantaneous utility is determined by his
wage, w. The unemployed worker receives unemployment benefits, B, as long
as he is eligible. When sanctioned, he receives Z. We show in proposition 1
below that B > Z. We assume that workers do not have access to a capital
market, so consumption equals income at each instant.
We take the utility functions to be strictly concave in income and leisure.
The unemployed worker’s instantaneous utility is decreasing in search effort,
since search reduces time available for leisure. The utility function for the
eligible unemployed worker is υ(B, sei ) and for the sanctioned worker it is
υ(Z, ssi ). The employed worker’s utility is given by υ(wi, h), where h denotes
hours of work; we take h as exogenously fixed.
Let r denote the subjective rate of time preference and let U j and E be
the expected present values of being unemployed, j = e, s, and employed,
respectively. The value functions can then be written as:
rUei = max
sei
{υ(B, sei ) + seiα(θ) (E − U ei )− µπ (sei ) (Uei − Us)} (5)
rU si = max
ssi
{υ(Z, ssi ) + ssiα(θ)(E − Usi )} (6)
rEi = υ(wi, h)− φ(Ei − Ue) (7)
The unemployed worker chooses search effort to maximize rU ji . The first-
order conditions are given by:
υs(B, s
e) + α(θ)(E − U e)− µπs (se) (U e − Us) = 0 (8)
υs(Z, s
s) + α(θ)(E − U s) = 0 (9)
where partial derivatives with respect to search effort are indicated by sub-
script s. In these expressions we have imposed symmetry, i.e., we have made
use of the fact that workers are identical and choose the same search ef-
fort. The first-order conditions convey the usual message:6 at the optimum,
6The second-order conditions for a maximum are fulfilled by the concavity of υ(·) and
the linearity of π.
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the marginal cost of search should equal the marginal benefits. The mar-
ginal cost is captured by foregone leisure, i.e., υs(B, se) and υs(Z, ss). The
marginal benefit involves the gain in utility associated with a transition to
employment, i.e., α(θ)(E − U j), j = e, s. For the eligible worker, there is
an additional benefit of more intensive search, as revealed by the third term
on the right-hand side of (8). More intensive search reduces the probability
of being sanctioned, thus prolonging the expected duration of benefit pay-
ments. This does not imply, however, that eligible workers necessarily search
harder than sanctioned workers. The effect pulling in the opposite direction
is B > Z: sanctioned workers gain more from finding a job than eligible
workers since E−Us > E−U e holds in equilibrium. Which effect dominates
depends on the parameters of the UI system.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that the instantaneous utility
functions take the form:
υ(m, l) = lnm+ Γ(l), m = {w,B,Z}, l = {1− h̄, 1− se, 1− ss}
where m denotes (real) income, which depends on the worker’s labor market
position and Γ(l) represents the value of leisure with Γ0(l) > 0 and Γ00(l) < 0.
The employed worker receives a wage w; the eligible unemployed worker
receives unemployment insurance, B; and an unemployed worker who has
been exposed to a sanction receives unemployment assistance, Z. Note that,
given the monitoring technology, this functional form implies that Z = 0
can never be optimal from a social point of view. Hence, in any welfare
maximizing system unemployment assistance will be strictly positive.
2.4 Firms and Wage Bargaining
Assume that government expenditure on benefits and monitoring is financed
by a proportional payroll tax paid by firms. Labor productivity is constant
and denoted y. The cost of holding a vacancy is ky, with k > 0. Let V denote
the present value of a vacant job and J the present value of an occupied job.
The value functions are of the usual form:
rV = −ky + q(θ)(J − V ) (10)
rJ = y − w(1 + t)− φ(J − V ) (11)
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where t is the proportional payroll tax rate. With free entry of new vacancies,
V = 0, we obtain the wage cost as proportional to the marginal product of
labor, i.e.,
w (1 + t) = [1− (r + φ)k/q(θ)]y (12)
Defining ω ≡ w(1 + t) and writing the right-hand side of this equation as
d (θ) y, we refer to ω = d(θ)y as the zero profit condition, with d0(θ) < 0.
The outcome of the Nash bargain
max
wi
[E(wi)− U e]β [J(wi)− V ]1−β , β ∈ (0, 1)









where V = 0 and symmetry have been imposed. The Nash bargain implies
a wage-setting relationship, i.e., a relationship between bargained wages and
labor market tightness. We assume that the government fixes the replace-
ment rates in this economy. Hence Z = zw and B = bw where z and b
are policy parameters. The replacement rates are defined with respect to
the economy-wide average wage which the individual employee perceives to
be independent of his wage demands; therefore ∂Ue/∂w = 0. Finally, the
relative size of the benefit sanction is denoted by p, i.e. p satisfies z = (1−p)b.
2.5 Equilibrium
Our assumptions imply that the model has a convenient recursive structure;
the model in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) has a similar structure. The
zero-profit condition and the wage-setting relationship determine θ and ω.
To see this, note that with free entry of vacancies we have J = ky/q(θ) and
ω = d(θ)y, which imply that the right-hand side of (13) is increasing in θ but
independent of sj. Moreover, the left-hand side of (13) is a function of θ but
independent of w given our chosen utility function and the fact that income
during unemployment is proportional to the aggregate wage. It can also be
shown that as long as search is optimally chosen E−U e does not depend on
sj. With θ determined, we get sj from (8) and (9), since the differences in
present values are independent of w. With θ and sj determined, we obtain
uj and n from (1)-(3).
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Notice that θ, ω, sj, uj and n are independent of the tax rate, t. The
latter can be determined residually from the government’s budget restric-
tion, noting that the government uses the wage tax to finance benefits and
monitoring costs:
twn = uebw + uszw + c (σ)µuew (14)
With the tax rate determined, the worker’s take-home wage is obtained from
w = ω/(1 + t).
3 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
The optimal unemployment insurance system involves four instruments: b,
p, µ, and σ. We assume that the government has a utilitarian objective
function (W ). We ignore discounting (see section 4.3 for the case with r > 0);
hence it is valid to compare alternative steady states without considering the
adjustment process. No discounting also has the convenient implication that
the steady state flow of profits is zero.7 Thus, the welfare objective is given
by W = uerUe + usrUs + nrE, which simplifies to an employment-weighted
average of instantaneous utilities with r → 0:
W = nυ(w, h) + ueυ(B, se) + usυ(Z, ss) (15)
The optimal policy maximizes (15) subject to the market equilibrium
conditions, sj = sj(b, p, µ, σ) and θ = θ(b, p, µ, σ), as well as the balanced
budget constraint, t = t(b, p, µ, σ). Let ρ = {b, p, µ, σ} denote the vector
of policy parameters. Hence the vector of first-order conditions is given by
(dW/dρ) = 0.
Before proceeding to the numerical results it is useful to state two an-
alytical results. First of all, the key result in Fredriksson and Holmlund
(2001) applies directly. The following proposition reiterates proposition 2 in
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001).
Proposition 1 The optimal policy involves p > 0.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. First, note that an optimal replace-
ment rate is strictly positive, b > 0. This follows from the utility function
7Write the aggregate flow of profits as π = n(y−w(1 + t))− kyv, use eq. (12) and the
flow equilibrium condition q(θ)v = φn and obtain π = nrky/q(θ).
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above with lnB = ln (bw). Consider the trial solution p = 0. At p = 0, the
first-order condition for σ has a solution at σ = 0 because c0 (σ) ≥ 0. More-
over, the condition for µ is irrelevant. So, let us fix µ at some arbitrary, but
interior, value: µ0 ∈ (0,∞). The uniform benefit structure (p = 0) cannot
be optimal if (dW/dp) > 0 at p = 0. Some manipulations of the first-order











where ∂W/∂ss > 0 denotes the partial derivative of welfare with respect to
ss holding θ constant, and ∂ss/∂p > 0 is also defined holding θ constant.
There are two key mechanisms that yield the sign of (16): there is a tax-
ation externality associated with search and there is an “entitlement effect”.
The taxation externality derives from the fact that, given that some insurance
is optimal (b > 0), taxes are required to finance unemployment expenditure.
Individuals, however, do not take into account that taxes can be lowered if
search intensity (and hence employment) increases. Therefore, ∂W/∂ss > 0.
Moreover, the so called entitlement effect (c.f. Mortensen, 1977) will operate
in this setting. Increasing the penalty will be conducive to search among
those who are sanctioned since individuals will be eager to find a new job in
order to qualify for (to be entitled to) UI benefit receipt, ∂ss/∂p > 0. As a
corollary to proposition 1, the optimal policy will involve an interior µ. In
other words, the two tiered benefit structure, b > 0, p > 0, and µ ∈ (0,∞),
dominates the uniform benefit structure in welfare terms.
Another interesting question is whether it will be optimal to have the
sanctioning rate depend on search intensity, given an optimal choice of b,
p, and µ. Since the inspection of search is the defining characteristic of the
monitoring and sanctions system in this setting, we can equally well phrase
the question as: Given an optimal choice of a UI system with time limits, is
it optimal to introduce a system of monitoring and sanctions? The following
proposition gives the condition when the answer turns out to be affirmative
Proposition 2 Let ρ̂ = {b, p, µ, σ = 0} denote the solution to the restricted
problem of optimal UI design. Then, the optimal policy will involve σ > 0 ifµ
b
µ
λ+ (1− λ)(1− p)







Proof. The proof proceeds as follows. Given that the two-tiered benefit
structure is optimal, there are interior solutions to the first-order conditions
(dW/db) = 0, (dW/dp) = 0, and (dW/dµ) = 0. An UI system with mon-
itoring and sanctions must be optimal if (dW/dσ) > 0 at the point where
σ = 0 and the remaining first-order conditions hold. Some manipulations of












where ∂W/∂se > 0 denotes the partial derivative of welfare with respect to
se holding θ constant, and ∂se/∂σ > 0 is also defined holding θ constant.










λ+ (1− λ)(1− p)







Equation (17) illustrates the basic trade-off in introducing a monitoring
and sanctions system. A monitoring and sanctions system restores the search
incentives among the eligible, ∂se/∂σ > 0. Again, this is a good thing since
there is a taxation externality which is not taken into account in the private
determination of search. However, inspecting search consumes real resources
as indicated by the second term in (17). If this cost is sufficiently high, the
monitoring and sanctions system will not be introduced.8
Proposition 2 relates to the result in Boone and van Ours (2000). Their
key result is that a monitoring and sanction system will be more efficient
in restoring search incentives than overall benefit reductions. This result
is derived by means of numerical solutions to a model which is essentially
identical to the present one, but with c0 = 0. Proposition 2 shows that their
conclusion holds analytically. In addition it extends their result further:
given c0 = 0, a system with monitoring and sanctions will dominate the
two-tiered benefit system analyzed by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001).
By inspection of (16) and (17), the extent that search responds to incen-
tives is going to be crucial for the amount of benefit differentiation and the
argument for introducing monitoring and sanctions.
8If introducing a sanction system involves a fixed set-up cost (besides C), then clearly
the set-up cost should not be too big either.
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4 Numerical Analysis
We have calibrated the model numerically so as to provide some information
on plausible numbers. The basic time unit is taken to be a quarter and
the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, H = aS1−ηvη, where we set η =
0.5.9 We fix hours of work exogenously to h = 0.75 and use the following





where κ < 1. The marginal product of labor is normalized to unity and we
impose β = η. This assumption corresponds to the Hosios (1990) efficiency
condition for the case where agents are risk neutral.10
We calibrate the model for a uniform benefit system (p = 0) with a
replacement rate of b = 0.3. The parameters a and χ are chosen with an
eye towards vacancy duration and search intensity. We set a = 1.7 and χ =
0.6. Remaining parameters (k, κ, and φ) are calibrated such that expected
unemployment duration is one quarter, the partial equilibrium elasticity of
the job hazard with respect to unemployment benefits equals −0.5, and the
unemployment rate equals 6.5 percent. The calibrated values imply, e.g.,
that the inflow into unemployment is 28 percent a year and that the expected
vacancy cost is almost a quarter of production. In the baseline calibration,
the expected vacancy duration is close to half a quarter and search intensity
equals s = 0.7.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values in the baseline economy.
Table 1: Baseline parameters
Interest rate (= rate of time preference) r = 0
Job destruction rate φ = 0.069519
Leisure value κ = 0.239419, χ = 0.6
Matching function η = 0.5, a = 1.7
Wage negotiations β = η = 0.5
Production y = 1
Vacancy costs k = 1.98335
9Broersma and Van Ours (1999) give an overview of recent empirical studies of the
matching function. They find that a value of η of 0.5 is a reasonable approximation.
10Note that in our case workers are risk averse and hence β = η is not sufficient for
efficiency.
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We also calibrate an alternative “less flexible” economy which has an
identical unemployment rate but search is less responsive to incentives.11
We obtain this characterization by lowering the constant in the matching
function by 15 percent to a = 1.445 and compensating for this by a reduction
in χ. A reduction in χ means that individuals place a lower value on leisure.
The consequences of this are twofold: first, they are willing to search harder;
second, and crucially, search is less responsive to changes in incentives. In
particular, the partial equilibrium elasticity of the job hazard with respect
to unemployment benefits equals −0.2 in this case. This is at the lower end
of the interval given by Layard et al. (1991). The value of χ implying an
unemployment rate of 6.5 percent, given the reduction in a, is χ = 0.364165.
The key outcomes in the base runs are reported in detail in columns 1 and 4
in Table 2.
4.1 Infinite vs Finite UI Benefit Duration
There are two natural focal points in the model. The first is the optimal
uniform system (which has infinite UI duration: µ = 0); the second is a
system with optimal time limits (finite UI duration: µ > 0 but σ = 0).
The last line of Table 2 presents welfare gains associated with particular
policies. The welfare gain has the interpretation of a “consumption tax” (in
percent) that equalizes welfare across two policy regimes. To be specific,
let WR represent welfare associated with a reference policy regime and WA
welfare associated with an alternative policy. Our measure of the welfare
gain of policy A relative to policy R is given by the value of the tax rate τ
that solves WA [(1− τ)m; ·] = WR. With logarithmic utility functions we
have ∆W ≡ WA −WR = − ln(1 − τ) ≈ τ . The welfare gains are always
reported relative to the optimal uniform system. In order to compare, say,
the system with time limits with the base run, one only has to take the
difference between the two entries for the welfare gain (∆W ).
11Let us be clear here: the key is that search intensity in the “less flexible” economy is
less elastic than search in the baseline economy. We coin this economy “less flexible” for
want of a better word.
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Table 2: Numerical results without monitoring and sanctions
Baseline economy Less flexible economy
Base run Optimal Optimal Base run Optimal Optimal
uniform time limit uniform time limit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b 0.300 0.363 0.553 0.300 0.441 0.557
p 0 0 0.410 0 0 0.305
µ — — 1.556 — — 1.199
σ — — 0 — — 0
se 0.700 0.607 0.556 0.839 0.734 0.715
ss — — 0.670 — — 0.774
θ 0.705 0.578 0.528 0.680 0.470 0.446
u (%) 6.50 8.13 8.19 6.50 8.73 8.75
ue (%) 6.50 8.13 2.84 6.50 8.73 3.36
us (%) — — 5.35 — — 5.39
w 0.913 0.909 0.908 0.903 0.897 0.896
t (%) 2.09 3.21 3.61 2.09 4.22 4.70
∆W (%) —0.33 0 0.21 —0.90 0 0.11
In columns 2 and 5 of Table 2, we report the results of determining the op-
timal uniform replacement rate. The optimal replacement rate in the baseline
economy is around 36 percent. A higher replacement rate reduces search in-
centives and incentives for wage restraint, so unemployment increases. With
the optimal uniform replacement rate, unemployment rises to 8.1 percent.
Individuals living in the baseline economy would be willing to pay 0.33 per-
cent of consumption to move from a replacement rate of 30 percent to an
optimal uniform one. The optimal uniform replacement rate in the “less
flexible” economy is higher since the cost of raising the replacement rate in
terms of reducing search incentives is lower. The replacement rate equals
44 percent in the less flexible economy and unemployment increases to 8.7
percent. Individuals in the less flexible economy would be willing to pay 0.9
percent of consumption in order to live in the optimal uniform system.12
The characteristics of the optimal system with time limits are given in
column 3 and 6. In the baseline economy, benefit differentiation is substantial
and the duration of UI benefit receipt is fairly short — the value of µ translates
12Notice that one should not compare the values of the consumption taxes across the
two economies since the utility functions are different.
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to an expected duration of around two months. The UI replacement rate
amounts to 55 percent of the wage; the penalty associated with the loss of
entitlement is around 41 percent. The benefit system with limited duration
is substantially more generous than the system with infinite duration; with
finite duration, unemployment expenditure per non-employed equals 40.5
percent. When search is less elastic, the UI replacement rate is about the
same (58 percent) as in our base case. However, the penalty associated
with loosing entitlement is decidedly smaller (31 percent), and the expected
duration of UI receipt is longer (around 11 weeks). The unemployment rate
is only marginally higher than in the uniform system.
Because the government has two additional instruments (µ and p) besides
b it is not surprising that the welfare gain in the exogenous time limit case
exceeds the welfare gain in the optimal uniform case in both economies. The
relative gain of introducing time limits is, however, smaller in the less flexible
economy than in the baseline economy. Also note that unemployment goes
up by moving from the optimal uniform system to exogenous time limits.
In other words, unemployment is not a sufficient statistic for welfare in this
case.
4.2 Monitoring and Sanctions
This section evaluates the case for monitoring and sanctions and calculate
the optimal monitoring and sanctions system. We also discuss the trade-off
between monitoring and sanctions and investigate whether the penalties and
sanctioning rates generated by the model are in broad conformity with the
data.
4.2.1 Are Monitoring and Sanctions Optimal?
The argument in favor of monitoring and sanctions hinges crucially on the
costs of this system. Unfortunately, the cost associated with monitoring and
sanctions is something of a black box. Therefore, we give an upper bound on
the marginal cost below which monitoring and sanctions are an ingredient of
the optimal system. Since this upper bound turns out to be very high, we
go on to characterize the optimal UI system with monitoring and sanctions.
Is it optimal to introduce monitoring and sanctions? In proposition 2
we stated the condition when the introduction of monitoring and sanctions
represents a welfare improvement. For the introduction of monitoring and
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sanctions to be a welfare improvement relative to the case with time limits,
c0(0) has to be less than the gain as represented by greater search incentives
among UI recipients with monitoring. We have calculated the cut-off value for
our two economies. In our base case, this cut-off value (ĉ) equals ĉ = 0.076;
in the alternative case, we have ĉ = 0.047. Both of these numbers have to be
considered extremely high. Since the marginal product of labor and the labor
force are normalized to unity, we can relate these cut-off values to (private
sector) GDP by dividing by the employment rate (which is around 92 percent
in the optimal system with time limits). So, the calculated cut-off values
suggest that as long as the marginal cost is no greater than 4.7/0.92 = 5.1
(7.6/0.92 = 8.3) percent of GDP, it is optimal to introduce monitoring and
sanctions. Since these numbers are very large, the introduction of monitoring
and sanctions is most likely a welfare improvement relative to the case with
time limits.
What is the optimal design of a monitoring and sanctions system? This
clearly depends on the exact form of the cost function c (σ). Assume that
c (σ) takes the form of c (σ) = δσ. To estimate a reasonable value for δ,
we used Swedish data on the relative number of employees at the Public
Employment Service (PES), since PES officers are responsible for monitoring
job search in Sweden. We also used information on how often each PES
employee meets a particular unemployed, and the fraction of total time that
the PES officer spends in meetings with the unemployed. This calculation,
which is presented in greater detail in Appendix B, suggests that the marginal
cost of monitoring is in the order of c(σ) = δσ = 0.00785. Provided that
σ ≥ 0.785 in Sweden, then δ = 0.01 is a conservative estimate. We also
conduct an alternative calculation where δ = 0.02. Note that in both cases
δ < ĉ and hence monitoring and sanctions improve welfare.
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Table 3: Numerical results with monitoring and sanctions
Baseline economy Less flexible economy
δ = 0.01 δ = 0.02 δ = 0.01 δ = 0.02
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b 0.626 0.617 0.619 0.610
p 0.564 0.584 0.511 0.570
µ 1.207 1.039 1.017 0.757
σ 1 1 1 1
se 0.755 0.746 0.856 0.848
ss 0.737 0.753 0.842 0.863
θ 0.407 0.408 0.371 0.373
u (%) 7.87 7.88 8.47 8.48
ue (%) 5.75 5.96 7.07 7.37
us (%) 2.12 1.92 1.40 1.11
w 0.906 0.906 0.894 0.894
t (%) 4.60 4.66 5.33 5.35
∆W (%) 0.82 0.75 0.55 0.48
Table 3 presents some numbers that correspond to the optimal systems
in each economy for the two values of δ. The optimal system involves σ = 1
given our assumption σ ∈ [0, 1]. This particular result should be taken with a
due grain of salt given the uncertainty about the costs of monitoring and the
properties of the inspection technology. It is nevertheless interesting to note
that a system with monitoring and sanctions are associated with non-trivial
welfare gains relative to the alternatives characterized in Table 2. Also note
that the optimal UI replacement rate is higher when we introduce monitoring
and sanctions. Both economies experience a slight fall in unemployment as
compared to Table 2, a result driven by a substantial increase in search
effort among the unemployed (particularly those eligible for UI who now face
additional incentives to search). Finally, note that the fraction of unemployed
with a sanction is considerably lower in Table 3 than in the columns with
exogenous time limits in Table 2. Less people need to be penalized in a
monitoring system in order to get similar welfare and search incentive effects.
Table 3 indicates that the trade-off between monitoring and sanctions
depends on the costs of monitoring: the higher the cost, the lower the mon-
itoring rate and the higher the penalty. We have examined this trade-off in
greater detail. In particular we have calculated optimal combinations of µ
and p for different values of δ, where δ is varied from zero to (implausibly)
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large numbers. We set σ = 1 and allow b to adjust optimally. In order to
approach the Beckerian corner solution (µ → 0, p → 1), monitoring costs
need to be extremely high. For example, if δ = 0.14 the optimal system
in the baseline economy features p = 0.929 and µ = 0.234. Risk aversion in
combination with a randommonitoring technology implies that it is generally
not optimal to impose the maximal sanction.
4.2.2 A Brief Look at the Data
Having calculated the optimal systems with monitoring and sanctions it is
tempting to relate the predictions of the model to the data. Some of the pa-
rameters of the monitoring and sanctions system are of course unobservable.
However, there are observations on the UI replacement rates, the penalties
for violating search requirements, and the associated sanctioning rates. Pre-
sumably, there is a lot of noise in the data pertaining to sanction rates.
Nevertheless, there is great variation in these data as is clear from Grubb
(2001). It seems that the US and Switzerland are the extreme cases in terms
of having systems with a large number of sanctions. In the US in the late
1990s, around 10 percent of beneficiaries were sanctioned each quarter for be-
havior during the benefit period. In addition, some 25 percent of the (stock
of) eligible unemployed were “sanctioned” because they exhausted their ben-
efits.13 Based on these data, the quarterly sanction rate in the US would be in
the order of 35 percent. With the exception of Switzerland, sanctions during
the benefit period are substantially less common in the European countries.
In fact, the sanction rates are typically lower than one percent per quarter;
see Grubb (2001) for further details.
The number of sanctions seems to be inversely related to the severeness
of the penalty. In the US, the normal sanction for a job search infringement
is a loss of benefits for one week.14 In Sweden, on the other hand, the penalty
until recently was the loss of benefits for twelve weeks.15
13This estimate is a crude average for the period 1995-2000. The number of exhaustions
per quarter amounted to some 600 000 individuals, the number of unemployed to 6.5
millions, and the fraction eligible for UI to 35 percent. Source: US Department of Labor
(labor force statistics and UI program statistics).
14Notice, though, that there is a rather harsh ”penalty” associated with the expiration
of UI benefits in the US. In 1991, benefits were reduced by more than 60 percent when
benefits expired and the individual was forced to claim welfare benefits instead; see Wang
and Williamson (1996).
15The Swedish system has recently been changed in the direction of smaller penalties.
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What does the model have to say about the number of sanctions? Figure
1 addresses this question by plotting the sanctioning rates against σ and
assuming δ = 0.01. In addition to the baseline and the less flexible economy,
we also consider an economy with low turnover.16 Sanctioning rates decline
in σ for two reasons: firstly, for given se, a rise in σ reduces π (se) ; and,
secondly, a rise in σ raises se.
Table 4: Quarterly sanction rates according to the model
Baseline economy Less flexible economy Low turnover economy
δ = 0.01 0.296 0.146 0.242
δ = 0.02 0.264 0.115 0.221
When σ = 1, as is optimal given our assumptions, the quarterly sanction
rates hover between 10 and 30 percent depending on the exact assumptions;
see Table 4. The number of sanctions in the baseline economy best conform to
sanctioning data for the US. To get at the numbers for the typical European
country, it appears that one would have to apply a combination of less elastic
search, lower turnover, and higher monitoring costs.
4.3 Discounting and the Distributional Effects of UI
Discounting (r > 0) adds another dimension to our analysis of optimal UI
policies. With discounting it makes a difference whether you are currently
unemployed with or without a sanction. Hence it is relevant to analyze the
distributional effects of optimal UI policies. Which category of workers are
the prime gainers from the policies that we are considering?
Taking discounting into account also adds a complication to the analy-
sis.17 With discounting it is no longer the case that the aggregate profits of
the firms are zero. Hence, we have to take a stance on what happens with
these profits. It turns out that our results below do not depend much on
16The “low turnover” economy has a lower job destruction rate φ (around 22 percent
per year) and higher value for a in the matching function to keep unemployment at the
baseline value of 6.5 percent.
17Moreover, it is no longer possible to show analytically that the declining benefit se-
quence is to be preferred over the flat benefit sequence; see Fredriksson and Holmlund
(2001) for further details. This is due to the wage pressure effect emphasized by Cahuc
and Lehmann (2000). However, in our numerical examples the case for restoring search
incentives is always stronger than the wage pressure effect.
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what choices we make. Again, the objective function for the social planner
is steady state welfare
W = nrE + uerU e + usrUs
and we assume that profits from firms are used to finance the UI system.
The government’s budget constraint is thus modified to
twn+ nrky/q(θ) = uebw + uszw + c (σ)µuew
where nrky/q(θ) is the aggregate profit. In this way we do not need to worry
about the distribution of the profits over the three categories of workers.18
Table 5 presents the numerical results for the three different UI systems
considered. We conduct the calculations for the baseline economy and report
the results for two values of the discount rate: 5 and 10 percent on an annual
basis. The marginal cost of monitoring (δ) is set equal to δ = 0.01.
We first note that discounting only marginally affects the actual policies
chosen. The parameters of the UI systems are very similar to the values
reported in Tables 2 and 3. Consequently, the outcomes in terms of search
intensities and unemployment are close to the ones we have reported earlier.
18Note that this assumption is approximately equivalent to assuming that workers own
firms in proportion to their income or that there is a separate group of risk neutral firm
owners in the economy.
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Table 5: Numerical results with discounting in the baseline economy
Annual discount rate: 0.05 Annual discount rate: 0.10
Uniform Time Monitoring Uniform Time Monitoring
system limit and sanctions system limit and sanctions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b 0.358 0.544 0.620 0.353 0.536 0.615
p 0 0.409 0.570 0 0.408 0.576
µ − 1.565 1.213 − 1.574 1.221
σ − 0 1 − 0 1
se 0.609 0.557 0.757 0.610 0.560 0.760
ss − 0.669 0.738 − 0.670 0.739
θ 0.573 0.524 0.404 0.567 0.520 0.401
u (%) 8.15 8.21 7.88 8.18 8.23 7.89
ue (%) 8.15 2.83 5.75 8.18 2.82 5.76
us (%) − 5.38 2.12 − 5.41 2.12
w 0.910 0.909 0.907 0.910 0.910 0.908
t (%) 1.96 2.40 3.54 0.73 1.20 2.49
∆W (%) 0 0.21 0.83 0 0.20 0.84
∆rE (%) 0 0.22 0.83 0 0.22 0.84
∆rUe (%) 0 0.27 1.03 0 0.34 1.25
∆rU s (%) 0 −0.001 0.10 0 −0.22 −0.63
∆rŨ (%) 0 0.09 0.78 0 −0.03 0.75
Notes: The welfare gains are measured relative to the optimal uniform systems. The
average welfare change for unemployed workers is denoted ∆rŨ , where rŨ =
rŨ = (u
e
/u)rUe+(us/u)rUs. The marginal cost of monitoring equals δ = 0.01
The most interesting information provided by this exercise is reported
at the bottom end of Table 5. The last four lines show the welfare gains
for different groups of individuals relative to the optimal uniform system.
The ranking of the welfare gains for the three groups conforms to what one
would expect. The eligible unemployed are the prime gainers, while those
on a sanction are the ones that gain the least from introducing time limits
or monitoring and sanctions. However, it is interesting to see that a moni-
toring and sanctions system makes everyone better off compared to a system
featuring a pure time limit. Unlike the time limit system, the monitoring
and sanctions system always improve the welfare of an average unemployed
worker. Moreover, monitoring and sanctions even increases the welfare for
those on a sanction for the moderate (and, in our view, more reasonable)
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annual discount rate of 5 percent.
The reason why a monitoring system makes even the unemployed with
a sanction better off than in a uniform system is the entitlement effect. Al-
though the unemployed with a sanction have a lower per period utility than
the unemployed under a uniform system, they can look forward to a more
generous unemployment insurance scheme after they lose their next job.19
When the discount rate is raised to 10 percent, the relative valuation of the
present state increases. In this case, the entitlement effect is not sufficient to
compensate for the direct utility loss.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the design of optimal unemployment insurance
in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed
is not perfectly observable. We have examined to what extent the optimal
policy should involve monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if ob-
served search is found insufficient. The results suggest that the introduction
of a system with monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement
for reasonable values of the monitoring costs. Those costs would have to be
implausibly high — higher than five percent of GDP — for this conclusion not
to hold.
The policy prescription following from our analysis is thus different from
Becker’s (1968) well known result, where the penalty should be maximal and
the probability of getting caught should be close to zero. There are two
key assumptions delivering our results. First, individuals are risk averse and,
second, monitoring is imperfect. With imperfect monitoring some individuals
will be sanctioned even though they search to rule and giving them the
maximal penalty is not optimal with risk aversion.
While we are reasonably comfortable in saying that monitoring and sanc-
tions represent a welfare improvement, it is much more difficult to give clear
advice on the characteristics of such a system. The reason for this conclusion
is that the exact formulation of the monitoring and sanctions system depends
on the cost of running such a system. Unfortunately, the cost of running the
system is something of a black box.
19The value of UI is higher with monitoring than with time limits for two reasons. First,
the UI replacement rate is higher. Second, the rate of being transferred to the "sanctioned
state" is a lot lower with monitoring.
24
An issue that we have not addressed is the possibility that formal search
requirements may induce individuals to use formal rather than informal
search methods and therefore bring little increase in total search intensity.
Nevertheless, it is likely that general search requirements — such as the num-
ber of job applications filed during a week — should minimize the risk of
substitution between search channels. Presumably, substitution is going to
be more severe in systems where search requirements are linked to formal
channels such as referrals by the public employment service. On this ac-
count, search requirements specified in terms of independent job search, as
used in the US, the Netherlands and Switzerland, seem to be preferable.
Appendix A: The Sanctioning Probability
This appendix addresses the “structural” interpretation of our sanctioning
probability: π(se) = 1− σse. Suppose, realistically, that benefit administra-
tors observe search with error: seo = s
e+ ε, ε ∈ [εL, εU ]. Since se ∈ [0, 1] then
so should seo. This in turn implies restrictions on εL, εU . If s
e
o ∈ [0, 1], it must
be true that εL = −se and εU = 1− se.
Let us introduce a parameter that indexes the extent of observation er-
ror. In particular let ε ∈ [−(1 − σ̃)se, (1 − σ̃)(1 − se)]. If σ̃ = 1, there is no
observation error. If σ̃ = 0, observed search belongs to the entire admissible
range. Suppose also that ε is uniform. Then σ̃ = 0 is a completely ran-
dom inspection technology. We think of σ̃ as a parameter that the central
government can invest resources in improving.
An individual is sanctioned whenever seo ≤ R, where R ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the search requirement. The probability of being sanctioned given that the


















Now we want to impose some restrictions on the parameters of the in-
spections technology (R, σ̃) to make sure that π ∈ [0, 1] for all se ∈ [0, 1]. We
impose the following conditions
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1. If se = 0 then π = 1.
2. If se = 1 then π ∈ [0, 1].
The first condition gives R = 1 − σ̃. Given R = 1 − σ̃, the second con-
dition yields σ̃ ∈ [0, 0.5]. The conditions we impose on the parameters thus
imply that an individual who searches full time is sanctioned with positive
probability, i.e., there is a probability of making Type II errors for all values
of se.
In sum, the above assumptions lead to the following formulation for π
π = 1− σ̃
1− σ̃ s
e, σ̃ ∈ [0, 0.5]
or alternatively, defining σ = σ̃/(1− σ̃)
π = 1− σse, σ ∈ [0, 1]
which is what we have in the main text.
Appendix B: Estimating the Marginal Cost of Monitoring
To obtain a reasonable value for the cost of monitoring an additional indi-
vidual (c(σ)) we performed the following calculation. We relied on data from
Sweden, where PES administrators are responsible for monitoring whether
unemployed individuals have searched to rule or not. Three sources of infor-
mation were used: (i) the relative number of employees at the PES; (ii) the
fraction of time that a PES officer meets with the unemployed; and (iii) the
number of contacts between the PES officer and a particular unemployed in-
dividual. Information pertaining to items (ii) and (iii) is taken from Lundin
(2000).
In the main text the total cost of the monitoring and sanctions system
was specified as: C = c(σ)µuew. To get an approximate value for C we start
by calculating the wage bill paid to individuals involved in monitoring. Since
the labor force and the marginal product of labor are normalized to unity,
the wage bill is measured relative to these items. The PES service employs
approximately 10,000 individuals in Sweden, which translates to around 0.25
percent of the labor force. On average PES officers spend 30 percent of their
time in meetings with the unemployed. Assuming that the unemployed are
monitored each time they meet with a PES officer we have C = 0.0025 ×
0.3w = 0.00075w. Thus we have C = c(σ)µuew = 0.00075w. Turning to the
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left-hand side of this equation, we set the number of unemployed individuals
eligible for UI to 5 percent. With this assumption, we only need an estimate
of µ to get an estimate of c(σ). The information used to estimate µ is derived
from a question put to PES officers regarding the number of meetings with
individuals searching for a job. When asked about their contact frequency,
35 percent of PES officers answered “at most once a month”; 34 percent
answered “at most once every other month”; and 31 percent answered “at
most once every quarter”. Thus on average a PES officer has (1×0.35+0.5×
0.34+0.31/3)×3 = 1.91 meetings with a particular unemployed per quarter.
Hence we have c(σ) = 0.00075/(µue) = 0.00075/(1.91 × 0.05) ≈ 0.00785.
There is still one unknown in this equation, however; the estimated value
of c(σ) pertains to a given value of σ. Assuming that c(σ) = δσ, we have
δ = 0.01 for σ = 0.785 and δ = 0.02 for σ = 0.785/2.
References
Abbring, J.H., G.J. van den Berg and J.C. van Ours (1997) The effect of
unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unem-
ployment to employment, Working Paper, Tinbergen Institute, Ams-
terdam.
Becker, G. (1968) Crime and punishment: An economic approach, Journal
of Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
Benus, J., J. Joesch, T. Johnson and D. Klepinger (1997) Evaluation of the
Maryland unemployment insurance work search demonstration: Final
report, Batelle Memorial Institute in association with Abt Associates
Inc (http://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/98-2/).
Black, D., J. Smith, M. Berger and B. Noel (2003) Is the threat of training
more effective than training itself? Evidence from random assignments
in the UI system, American Economic Review, 93, 4, 1313-1327.
Boone, J. and J. van Ours (2000) Modelling financial incentives to get unem-
ployed back to work, Discussion Paper 2000-02, CentER for Economic
Research, Tilburg University.
27
Broersma, L. and J.C. van Ours (1999) Job searchers, job matches and the
elasticity of matching, Labour Economics, 6, 77-93.
Cahuc, P. and E. Lehmann (2000) Should unemployment benefits decreases
with the unemployment spell?, Journal of Public Economics, 77, 135-
153.
Fredriksson, P. and B. Holmlund (2001) Optimal unemployment insurance
in search equilibrium, Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 370-399.
Garoupa, N. (1997) The theory of optimal law enforcement, Journal of
Economic Surveys, 11 267-295.
Grubb, D. (2001) Eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits, in Labour
Market Policies and Public Employment Service, OECD.
Hopenhayn, H.A. and J.P. Nicolini (1997) Optimal unemployment insur-
ance, Journal of Political Economy, 105, 412-438.
Hosios, A.J. (1990) On the efficiency of matching and related models of
search and unemployment, Review of Economic Studies, 57, 279-298.
Johnson, T. and D. Klepinger (1994) Experimental evidence on unemploy-
ment insurance work-search policies, Journal or Human Resources, 29,
695-717.
Lalive, R., J.C. van Ours and J. Zweimüller (2002) The effect of benefit
sanction on the duration of unemployment, Discussion Paper 3311,
Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman (1991) Unemployment: Macroeco-
nomics performance and the labour market, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Lundin, M. (2000) Tillämpningen av arbetslöshetsförsäkringens regelverk
vid arbetsförmedlingarna, stencil 2000:1, Office of Labour Market Pol-
icy Evaluation (IFAU), Uppsala.
Mortensen, D.T. (1977) Unemployment insurance and job search decisions,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 30, 505-517.
28
Pissarides, C.A. (1990) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
Polinsky, A.M. and S Shavell (1979), The Optimal Tradeoff between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, American Economic Review, 69,
880-891.
Polinsky, A.M. and S. Shavell (2000) The economic theory of public enforce-
ment of law, Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 45-76.
OECD (2001) Labour Market Policies and Public Employment Service, Paris.
Shavell, S. and L. Weiss (1979) The optimal payment of unemployment
insurance benefits over time, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 1347-
1363.
van den Berg, G.J. and B. van der Klaauw (2001) Counselling and moni-
toring of unemployed workers: Theory and evidence from a controlled
social experiment, Working Paper 2001:12, Institute for Labour Market
Policy Evaluation (IFAU), Uppsala.
van den Berg, G.J., B. van der Klaauw and J.C. van Ours (2004) Punitive
sanctions and the transition rate from welfare to work, Journal of Labor
Economics, 22, 211-241.
Wang, C. and S. Williamson (1996) Unemployment Insurance with Moral
Hazard in a Dynamic Economy, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
















Precision of inspection technology (σ)
Figure 1: Quarterly sanction rates, δ=0.01
